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ECONOMIC AID TO LESS -DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1953-1969
Janos Rorvath, Patrick Yeuns, Carl J. Gahwller
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent development of grants economics, the real transfers
involved in economic aid by advanced countries to less developed ones
can be assessed on a quantitative subsidy basis. The purpose of this
paper is to measure and analyse the grant component in official^ United
States economic aid to less-developed countries from 1953 to I969. The
United States is chosen, not only because of the availability of rele-
vant statistical data, but because she merits special study as contribu-
tor of over half of net global foreign aid.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II lays out the conceptual
framework for analysing the grant ccanponent in foreign aid; section III
describes the official United States foreign assistance programs in con-
Junction with the empirical analysis; and section IV presents the sum-
mary of our findings and conclusions.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Economic Aid
Our definition of economic aid in this paper follows the O.E.C.D.
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). It consists
of "all flows to less-developed countries and multilateral institu-
tions provided by official agencies,"^ which meet the following tests:
(a) their prime objective is to promote economic welfare and
development in less-developed countries; and
(b) their financial terms are intended to be concessional.
Grants
"Grants economics identifies the bilateral exchange versus the uni-
lateral transfer components in the varying admixture of market and non-
market economic activity. "^ A grant in this context is an outright gift
for which no repayment or favor is directly expected in the sense of an
exchangeable quid pro quo .^ Certain portions of U.S. aid are 100 percent grant
(e.g., Peace Corps expenditures, contributions to multinational organiza-
tions, surplus food donations, etc.). In addition, there, are significant
gramt elements in development and Eximbank-' loans, due to their varying
concessionary terms. A loan at (or above) the prevailing market rate
of interest and v/ithout concessions in repayment terms contains zero (or
negative) percent grant. As the loan terms "soften" from this point,
the proportion of grant increases, approaching 100 percent (though never
reaching it as long as repayment of some kind, regardless of how conces-
sional, or "soft," is due). Our task in this research is to identify

the grant components (from to 100 percent) in various official U.S.
foreign economic aid programs.
The Grant Component of Economic Aid
The grant (subsidy) component of an economic aid program may be
measured in absolute value, called "grant equivalent," or in relative
terms, called "grant ratio." The latter is the ratio of the grant equi-
valent to the value of the aid committment. If the grant equivalent
is equal in value to the aid committment, the grant ratio is 1. The
grant ratio therefore varies between the extremes of and 1.
Since the nominal or face value of the aid committment constitutes
the base from which the grant equivalent or the grant ratio is computed,
neither measure of the grant component presents a complete accounting
of the net cost or sacrifice of the aid program to the donor or its
total impact (positive or negative benefit) on the recipient. This is
a limitation of the present state of grants economics for which much
additional research is needed. On the empirical level, the effects of
grants have not been successfully cast within a completely specified
cost-benefit framework. Understandably, this is due in large measure
to the difficulty in measuring all secondary effects or repercussions
of economic aid. We shall therefore rely on the conventional "pure"
measures of the grant component in economic aid, that is, on what may
be called the "contract terms basis" which will become clear as we pro-
ceed.'
Concessionary Factors
In attempting to measure the grant equivalent embodied in foreign
econoirtic aid loans, concessionary factors are crucial. At the outset,
the contract terms of the loan to be considerered are the interest

rates, years of maturity, and moratoriiun (grace) periods. Gtoran Ohlin's
Q
pioneering formula may be used to yield the familiar grant ratio. This
formxiLa calculates the discounted present value of the loan principal '
and interest repayments. These repayments are deducted from the face
value of the loan, the difference being the grant equivalent of the
losm. The grant equivalent can be considered as the value 6f the re-
sources sacrificed by the donor country because of its aid .loan at com-
paratively "soft" terms as against the return vhich could presumably be
earned if invested for commercial profit (the opportunity cost) in de-
veloping countries.
During the grace years, only interest is repaid. Interest and prin-
cipal repay^nents are made during the remainder of the loan period un-
til maturity. The interest during the grace and non-grace years may
differ.
Following Ohlin,° the present value of the grace years interest
repayments is given by:
^1
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'"" dt = -i L (1 - e-^« ) (1)
and that of the non-grace years principal and interest payments is:
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where
L face value of loan
P present value
ij^ interest during grace years
• irp interest during nongrace years

q comparative rate of discount (opportunity cost)
T maturity of loan (in years)
t individual years within the loan maturity
M grace period (in years) i.e., moratorium
e base of natural logarithm, 2.718
The grant ra.tio, g, is given as:
g =
L - (P^.H- Pg)
(3)
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For a "typical" example, a loan which has a 10-year grace period at 2% in-
terest and a total matvirity of kO years at 3% interest (the 3% interest
is applied to the last 30 years of the loan), and using a comparative dis-
count rate (q) of 10^, gives.
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= 0.6816 ( or 68.16^ jjrant). (5)
Trading Factors
Our formulation of the grant ratio in this research goes heyond that
of Ohlin's to include the recent expanded considerations of Janos Horvath
to which he refers as "trading factors" as distinct from concessionary
factors.. These trading factors include: (l) tied aid; (2) loans repay-
able in local ^recipient country's) currency; and (3) surplus commodities.

(l) Tied aid ; The tying of aid to purchases in the donor country
tends to reduce the aid value to the recipient. This results if the
prices paid for equipment or commodities in the donor country are higher
than world market prices, or if such equipment is designed inappropriately
for the recipient country's utilization. To the extent that the reci-
pient country is restricted from importing from the cheapest source, the
12
extra cost clearly reduces the grant element of the aid transfer.
The computation of the tied aid adjustment factor, designated as g^ , is
13
made according to the formula:
v U.S.
, „
.J x- Jg = X percent of aid tied
V
where
P = the price index on the world market
w "^
P^j „ = the U.S. price index
Tied aid contains a "negative grant." It is acceptable to recipient
countries because "tied aid is better than no aid." There may be cases
in which the direct costs from aid tying not only reduce but even offset
the concessionary benefit of the loan terms. The U.S. inititated aid
tying policies in 1959 with the intention to ease balance of payment pres-
sures. The balance of payments gain from tied aid, however,; is less than
the face value of the aid because, even if aid were offered untied, it is
likely that at least a few commodities would be purchased in the donor
couTitry. The true gain in trade expansion is the difference between the
export under the regime of tied aid and those exports attributable to an
equivalent amount of untied aid. Throughout this analysis we assiune that
forty percent of aid amounts would be spent in the United States even with-
out tying; this appears to be a conservative estimate because, during 1959,
before aid-tying restrictions were imposed, the percentage of U.S. aid-

financed ccroraodities purchased domestically was kj.^l percent and similar fig-
ures prevailed for earlier years.
(2) Loan repayment in local currency ; In the 1950 's and early
60's, local currency loans comprised the major portion of U.S. develop-
ment assistance and, after I962, were gradually converted to dollar
values. Since I967, virtually all development loans were on dollar
repayment terms ,^°
As local currency loan arrangements prevent the conversion of
the repayments to U.S. dollars (or any other currency), their monies
eventually return to the recipient covintry. Specifically, the U.S.
retains part of the proceeds for its own uses within the recipient
country (e.g., for payment of embassy personnel, scholar exchange acti-
vities, etc.), and returns the remainder in the form of loans and out-
right grants. For this reason, the O.E.C.D. treats, local currency
loans as grant-like-flows which is technically inaccurate. John Pincus
estimated them as 80 percent grant and 20 percent loan. ' To identify
precisely the Pincus estimate, local currency loans are analyzed by
the following procedure:
Initially they are submitted to the grant ratio formula described
above. From the "exchange equivalent" (the grant equivalent complement),
the funds designated for U.S. -use are deducted.
--Of the remaining exchange
equivalent, the portion designated for grants is valued as lOOfj grant,
and the loan portion is submitted to the grant ratio formula a second
tiiae. The second exchange equivalent is subject to one final manipu-
lation to arrive at the local currency re-loan factor, designated as
g2. The repayment funds are blocked except for U.S. -use in the recipi-
ent country. "The trick is to value the blocked local currency at its

8true worth to the donor country by use of what is called a 'shadow'
rate of exchange, as opposed to the nominal rate; in other words,
the rate at which the donor would he willing to bioy the blocked baj.-
ances." The calculation of this "shadow exchange rate" index is
presented in the Appendix, Table B. The index is multiplied by the
percent of total aid which the blocked local currency loans represent.
The product reflects the official (higher) exchange rate versus the
market rate and, therefore, indicates an additional grant component.
Due to occasional currency depreciation, the go trading factor's grant
19
ratio is raised IpA percent. The factor is raised an additional
50 percent to account for waivers on installments and Interest in con-
20
nection with their particular items.
(3) Surplus commodities :
21
For the third trading factor, Horvath provides a generalized for-
mula to reduce the domestic, government supported price of surplus agri-
cultural commodities to export market values. However, as the agricul-
22 •tural aid data were obtained in terms of export market values, the
third trading factor formula needs no elaboration here. -^
Comprehensive Grant Ratio
From the preceding discussion, the appropriate final grant ratio
2kformula which adjusts for the trading factors is
g' = g + (-S;j_+ gg) (7)
where
g' the comprehensive grant ratio
g the conventional grant ratio (a la Ohlin)
g^ the tied aid factor
go the local currency factor.

9III. EI.IPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The period chosen for this study is 1953-19^9} because during
the post-VJorld V7ar II years prior to 1953 j U.S. foreign aid was direct-
ed principally tov,'ard European recovery under the Marshall Plan, and
vas not extended on a world-wide basis until 1953. Direct military
aid is excluded from our scope of consideration. Currently, U.S.
foreign aid is administered through four channels: the Agency for
International Development (A.I.D.), the Peace Corps, the Export-Import
Bank (Eximbank), and the Food for Peace program (P.L. i+So).
Program Evolution
From 19^8 to 1952, the Economic Cooperation Administration (E.C.A.)
administered U.S. foreign aid. The Mutual Security Act vas passed in
1951 3-Dd reported on aid transactions through 1953. The Foreign Oper-
ations Administration (F.O.A.) was the official agency from 1953 to
1955. Thence, the International Cooperation Administration (l.C.A) was
organized and operated until 196I. The Development Loan Fund was estab-
lished and operated concurrently from 1957 to 196I. In I96I, all pre-
decessor agency functions were taken over by the present Agency for In-
ternational Development (A . I .D
.
)
.
Public Law hQo^ the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act, was passed in 195^5 and administered surplus agricultural commo-
dities under the Food for Freedom program. In 1966, Public Law 808 was
passed, giving rise to the Food for Peace Act. (The program is still
commonly referred to as P.L. USo in spite of the legislative change.)
The Peace Corps v/as created in I96I.
The Export-Import Bank has existed since 193^. This institution.
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to promote U.S. exports, is not financed by the Federal bud£:;et. Al-
though Exirabanlc has the possibility of borrovring on favorable terras
froai the U.S. Treasury, its resources are obtained mainly through
loan repayments
.
Agency for International Development
A.I.D. administers funds under the follov;ing categories:
(a) Development Loans: Loans are offered in both dollars (donor
country's currency) and local (recipient country's) currency. They
are authorized on the basis of project, program, and sector loans.
(b) Supporting Assistance: Tlais category is granted primarily
to combat economic or political instability in countries engaged in ma-
jor defense efforts, and in the 1950's was termed Defense Support. Ap-
proximately 10 percent of supporting assistance is termed counterpart
25funds, -^ This portion, designated for U.S. -use in the recipient country,
constitutes an exchange element and is therefore excluded as grant.
(c) Technical Cooperation (also termed Technical Assistance): This
type of aid is considered 100 percent grant and consists of (i) students,
trainees, experts, and volunteers sent to foreign countries, (ii) the
supply of equipment for research or training, and (iii) the support of
educational programs. (The Peace Corps is considered a special form of
technical assistance.)
(d) Multinational Assistance: Two types of aid are covered by this
category: (i) contributions to the development effort of the United
Nations and its associative organizations, and (ii) capital subscriptions
to multilateral financial institutions. These funds are treated as
full grants.
(o) Contingency Fund: These appropriations are reserved for emer-
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gency situations resulting from economic or political crises. They
are treated as full
.
grants
.
(f) Administrative Expenses: These appropriations, considered
as part of the cost of assistance, are treated as full grants.
Peace Corps
See (c) Technical Cooperation above.
Export-Lnport Banlv
Eximbank is in a sense two institutions: one issues insurance and
guarantees, 'and the other authorizes various types of loans. The for-
mer transactions are not considered foreign aid. The latter consists
of (i) long term loans, (ii) commodity credits, (iii) exporter credits,
(iv) special foreign trade (emergency) credits, and (v) discount credits.
Within our present context, only long term loans and exporter credits
26
are considered as foreign aid, while the others are not. The distinc-
tion is made because emergency credits are used primarily for direct
military purposes (vhich is outside of our scope of consideration) or
for stabilizing local currency crises, vith the credits for the latter
usually being cancelled before utilization; commodity credits, desig-
nated for 'the exportation of raw cotton, are exchange transactions; so
are discou::t credits, initiated in I966, which are made available to
U.S. commercial banks at or near private interest rates against their
holding cf export debt obligations.
Food for Peace
In 195^, P.L. U80 consisted of three aid categories: Title I
(sales for local currencies), Title II (donations for emergency relief
and economic assistance), and Title III (donations to U.S. volujntary
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agencies). Title TV (sales for dollars) vas introduced in 1959- IJ^
1966, the earlier programs were replaced by P.L. 808 which provided
two categories: Title I (sales for dollars and local currencies) and
Title II (donations). Barter is also included and consists of the
exchange of agricultural commodities for (i) materials for which the
U.S. is a consistent net imporoer, (ii) conmcdities required for for-
eign aid programs, and (iii) materials or equipment required for off-
shore construction programs.
We treat sales for dollars and local currencies as foreign aid loans,
and all donations as 100 percent grants. As regards barter, 25.6? per-
cent of aJLl P.L. kOO agreements from 195^ to mid-1969 are earmarked for
U.S. -use, constituting an exchange element. Deducting this percen-
27
tage, the remainder is treated as full grants.
Computations
In computing the grant ratios and grant equivalents, the following
stipulations are made:
(a) A comparative (i.e., opportunity) rate of discount 10 percent
is utilized throughout the analysis which represents the rate of return
private investors expect to earn in developing countries. This rate
is also used in O.E.C.D. calculations and, therefore, provides a basis
28
for ccmpariscn.
(b) All data are presented on the basis of aid commitments rather
than actvial deliveries, for which data are often difficult to come by.
Coard-tments , defined as firm obligations, are the best means to assess
comparatively donor aid policies and are a useful indication of the
direction the prograras may be expected to take.
(c) Prior to 196^ j due to the absence of detailed inforuiation,

13
yearly averages are used for the loan terras applied to the respective
total loan figures.
(d) In local currency P.L. kSO sales and local currency develop-
ment loans, a percentage of the exchange equivalent is designated for
U.S. -use (in the recipient country) with the remainder, termed co\antry-
use funds, returned to the recipient in the form of loans and grants.
The percentage designated for U.S. -use from P.L. ^8o sales is applied
for development loans also.
"
30
The results of ovir computer-programmed computations are summarized
and presented in Tables 1-3.
IV. FDJDINGS AM) CONCLUSIOllS
An Assessment of the Grant Components
Yearly U.S. aid commitments, respective grant equivalents, and
grant ratios are shown in Table 1. For the period of 1953-1969 the
-total aid commitment is $65.9 billion, the total grant equivalent is
$kj.9 billion, and the corresponding weighted average grant ratio is
0.7269. Table 2 reveals the comprehensive grant ratios. The ratios
have been fairly constant with the exception of the last three years
considered. During the i\Q.l period analyzed, the figures have varied
from a high of 0.85^2 in 1953 to a low of 0.^996 in I967. The effect
of g^ (aid tying) has varied from zero in base year I953 to -9.67'fo in
1968. This trading factor's effect has been increasing, although fluc-
tuations occurred. The effect of g (soft currency loans), with minor
variations, has been relatively negligible; bclovr one-half percent on
the average. The trend of the comprehensive grant ratio has shov;n a
slow decline. This can be seen graphically in Graph 1, which also de-

1^
picts the increasing trend of total official aid. Official aid reached
an all time peak of $6,191 billion in I967.
A glance at Graph 1 reveals that major fluctuations in the compre-
hensive grant ratio occurred in four periods: 1955-56, +0.093^; 1956-57,
-O.I2UU; 1959-60, +0.0818; and 1966-67, -0.1382. In the 1955-56 period,
the increase is due primarily to tvo factors: (a) the Food for Peace
coonitments (having, in general, high grant ratios), increased approxi-
mately three-fold, and (b) Eximbank funds (which have low grant ratios)
decreased by roughly one-third. Eximbank fluctuations are also the
prime influence in the remaining three periods. In the 1956-57 grant
ratio increase J S>:inbank funds increased roughly five-fold; in the 1959-6O
decrease, Eximbank funds were cut by approximately one-half; and in the
1966-67 decrease, Eximbank funds were decreased by a factor of nearly
two and one-half. Decreases in the comprehensive grant ratio reflect
a widening gap between total official aid and the grant equivalent.
Table 3 contains grant ratios of the various types of dollar and
local currency loans. The local currency loans generally have higher
grant ratios than dollar loans. While the terms of repayment usually
are harder in the local currency leans, the majority of their repay-
ments are re-lent or granted back to t'ne recipient country, raising
significantly the grant ratio. Yet, in 196l-196'j-, the grant ratio
is higher for dollar devej.opraent loans than for local ciirrency develop-
ment loans. The main factor in this interesting paradox is that, in
these years, U.S. -use funds constitute more than the actual exchange
eq'oivalent recovered from the local carrency loans and even "borrowed"
temporarily a portion of the grant equivalent, thus reducing the total
grant equivalent in the original loan terms. The Table 3 also indi-
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cates the decreasing trend of local currency develcpiaent loans and
local currency P.L. kQO sales, while ?.L. U8o dollar salcc are
^1
climbing.
Fxirthenaore , the computed grant ratios reflect the perennial over-
haul of foreign aid policies.-^" Development loans and surplus comraodity
sales were offered during the 1950's at interest rates slightly over
3'ii, which was reduced to 0.75?ci in I96I. From this extremely generous
condition, interest rates slowly have grown harder until the levels of
2$ during grace years and 3% during nongrace years were reached in I969.
Another feature of the reduction in concessionary terras is that from
completely untied aid prior to 1959 (except for Eximbank loans), the
percent of U.S. aid-financed and domestically purchased commodities
reached 98.9^^0 in I969.
Other Conclusions
Three principal conclusions are dravm from the subject analysis.
1. While total official U.S. aid generally has increased d\aring
the I953-I909 period, the comprehensive grant ratio has experienced a
slov; decreasing trend. In only three fiscal years during the period
analyzed, 190?, 19^8, and I969, has the ratio dropped below 50 percent.
Ko-v/ever, a significant point is to be made here. The huge increase of
Eximbank loans is the prirae factor in this recent grant ratio decrease.
For example, in 196p, the grant ratio is 0.792 and, in I967, it is O.586.
Tne exclusion of Eximbank loans frora the calculations results in grant
ratios of O.S56 and O.Sii-O, respectively, thus reversing the apparent total
grant ratio decrease.
2. The effects of tied aid have been estiraated to average approxi-
mately 10 to 20 percent, with individual cases as high as U9.3 percent.
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The VJorld Export Index (see the Appendix) has shown this figure to
averace lO.T^ji from I953 throuch I969 (li+.aj'/o during the last decade).
The eroding effect on the grant ratio during the period analyzed has
averaged
-3.69fo {-h.^S^i during the last decade).
3. The grant ratio of local currency development loans and local
currency P.L, U80 sales during I953-I969 is O.76II and 0.7588, respec-
tively. In this connection, Pincus's initial estimate of oO percent
grant and 20 percent loan is substantiated as quite accurate.

Table 1
U.S. AID COMMITMENTS AND GiUNT ELH-IENTS, 1953-1969
13
Fiscal
Year
Total Aid Comaiitraent
(Millions of Dollars)
Total Grrait Equivalent
(Millions of Dollars)
Grant
Ratio (g)
1969
196S
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963.
1962
1961
1960
1959
195S
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
Total
3,789.2
5,295.0
6,191.0
5,075.0
4,271.4 .
4,363.7
4,472.3
4,649.4
4,276.2
3,405.7
3,791.7
3,313.8
4,256.1
2,686.2
2,224.3
1,466.0
2,374.9
65,901.9
2,461.5
3,319.5
3,626.9
3,674.2
3,383.0
3,413.0
3,543.4
3,675.7
3,127.2
2,576.2
2,557.9
2,384.3
3,045.6
2,243.3
1,660.8
1,184,3
2,026.7
47,903.5
.6496
.6269
.5858
.7240
.7920
.7821
.7923
.7906
.7313
.7564
.6746
.7195
.7156
.8400
.7466
.8078
.8534
.7269
Sources:
Agency for International Development, Operations Report
,
Fiscal Years 1954-1969;
International Cooperation Administration, Operacions Report
,
June 30, 1956-1961,
and November 16, 1955;
Foreign Operations /vdninistration. Monthly Operations Report , July 31, 1954;
Alexis Z. Lachman, The Local Currency Proceeds of Foreign Aid (Paris; O.E.C.D., 1969);
Export-Import Bank of the United States, Fiscal Year 1967-1969 Reports ; Washington. '
Export-Import Bank of Washington, Report to the Congress
, 1960-1966, and June 30, 1959,
Peace Corps, Seventh .\nnual Report
, June 30, 1968;
U.S. Department of Agriculture, P.L. 430 Congressional Sales
.
September, 1970;
U.S. President, The Foreign Assistance Program
, Annual Report to the Congress,
Fiscal Years 1964-1969.
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Table 2
U.S. COMPREIffiKSIVE GRANT RATIOS, 1953-1969
Fiscal Grant
Ratio
(g).
Trading Factor Effects Comprehensive
Year Aid Tying
(gl)
Soft Currency
(g2)
Grant Ratio
(g')
1969 ,6hsS -.0829 +.0008 .5675
1963 .6269 -.0967 +.0021 .5323
1967 .5858 -.0866 +.0004 .4996
1966 .72i^0 -.0it58 +.0008 .6790
1965 .7920 -.0359 +.0030 .7591
196I+
.7821 -.0260 +.0014 .7575
1963 .7923 -.0264 +.0009 .7668
1962 .7906 -.0227 +.0004 .7683
1961 .7313 -.02^7 - - .7066
i960 .756it -.0116 +.0176 .7624
1959 .67^+6 -.0237 +.0033 .6542
1958 .7195 -.0123 +.0080 .7152
1957 .7156 -.0097 +.0086 .7145
1956 .8400 -.0029 +.0082 .8453-
1955 .Ikes -.0088 +.0043 .7^21
195^ .8078 -.0030 +.0028 .8076
1953 .853i^ - - +.0008 .8542
VJeighted
Average
.7269 -.0569 +.0035 .6935
Source: Refer to Table 1,
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Table 3
GRMT RATIOS OF U.S. FOREIGN AID LOAN PROGRAMS
(millions of dollars)
Fiscal Dollar loans Loca:1 currency loans
Year Develop- Grant PL 1+80 Grano Develop- Grant PL 1*80 GranT,
nent ratio ratio ment ratio ratio
1969
.
722.2 .6831 i+11.0 .6099 — «• V M> 337.0 .7709
1968 l,Oi*U.O .72UU 306.0 .6099 - - _ _ 723.0 .8076
1967 1,108.6 .122,h 178.0 .6138 _ _ - - 803.0 .7839
1966 1.207.8 .7330 181.0 .6138 21*.
6
.7927 866.0 .7917
1965 1.128.0 .76U1 158.0 .6138 3l*.9 .7937 1 ,11*2.0 .8517
I96U 1.21*9.0 .8299 1*6.0 .651*7 65.7 .7991 1,056.0 .8193
1963 1,159.2 .8172 58.0 .6956 128.8 .7997 1 .088.0 .81*16
1962 877.1 .8172 19.0 .7366 219.3 .7998 1,030.0 .8181
1961 261.8 .8092 _ _ - - 392.7 .8001 951.0 .7368
i960 177.1 .5052 - - - - 31*3.9 .7171* 82l*.0 .6831
1959- 15.6 .5hkl _ _ - - 505.6 .7559 72l*,0 .1*927
1958 7.6 .5lSh - - - - 21*1*. 5 .7517 658.0 .6960
1957 - - - - - - - - 332.7 .7520 908.0 .6960
1956 8.1; .1;90U - - 202.1* .71*1*6 1*39.0 .6877
1955 - - - - _ _ - - 209.5 .7913 73.0 .6877
195J^
-
-
-
-
-
- 100.0 .7330 _ _ - -
1953 '- - - - - - _ _ 16.1* .7317 - - - -
8,966.1* .7601 1,357.0 .6182 2,821.0 .761111,622.0 .7588
Source-: Refer to Table 1.
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Appendix: L\DEX COI-IFJTATIOKS
Two indices are required in the trading factor analysis: one
to measure the relationship of United States versus world market
export prices and the other to reflect the difference between offi-
cial versus market currency exchange rates. The former is used in
the aid tying calculations to indicate the loss of exports had aid
been offered on an untied basis, while the latter is utilized in sha-
dow exchange rate calculations for local cirrrency loans.
U.S. versus World Export Price Index
The index figures in Table A of this Appendix, which represent the
value of U.S. export prices, are assimed to reflect a "basket of goods"
commodity mix similar to actual aid-financed domestic commodity expendi-
tures. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan
are regarded as the countries v/hich could effectively compete with the
United States for these commodity expenditures. Thus, the U.S. export
price index is compared with the average price index of the competing
countries and the percent difference is shown. This derived ratio re-
flects the loss of exports attributable to foreign aid due to the price
differential had aid been offered untied.^^
Official versus var}:et Ciirrency Exchange Rate Index
Due to limited availability of data, three countries, India, Pakis-
tan, and Brazil, are used in the calculation of the shadow exchange rate
index. These countries represent approximately G% of the 195^-1969
P.L. i.-30 sales and approximately ^7^^ of other local currency sales during
thiis period. The weighting of these countries, v/hich reflects the flow
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of financial resources in both categories, are: India 6^%, Pakistan
21^, and Brazil 1^%. The index calculated in Table B of this Appen-
dix is assiwi-Tied to approximate the data for the remaining countries
in the group. The exchange rate considered for each year is the rate
as of June 30.
To calculate the index, the average local currency units per U.S.
dollar from Table B are utilized in the following manner:
India =
—^ = O.696 at 63% weighting = O.i+52
U Ul
Pakistan = g-^-j^ = 0.523 at 21^ weighting = 0.110
Brazil = ~Iq '^? = O.i+77 at ll+$? weighting = O.06T
100^ 0.629
Accordingly, 0.629 reflects the market value of local currency repay-
ments, while its conplenent (l - 0.629), 0.371, indicates the grant propor-
tion which is to be utilized in the shadow exchange rate calculations for
trading factor g_.

%Pc>j^T.:\i.'.\: Tabic A. K>:;oR'i; trad3 i:;d;':<: 1953 = 100
Covuitry 1953 195^ 1955 1956 1957 1955
United States 100 99 100 lOi^ 107 109
unitea ran^aca
Prance
Ger^iariy
Italy
Canada
100 99 101 105 ilO 109 109
100 91+ 95 99 101 97 89
100 98 98 101 103 103 103
100 99 98 102 102 101 9^
100 98 99 103 105 103 105
100 96 91 ^ 97 <^ 9^
:cn-U.S. Index 600 53^^- 532 Sch 618 607 59^
Average ICor.-U.S. Index 100 97.3 97.O 100.7 IO3.O 101.2 99-0
^^world"\-.S.^ "^ ^world "- -'0175 -.0309 -.0328 -.0388 -.047i| -.1010
Sc-d-'ces : United "ations Statistical' Yearbook 1959 ? Eleventh Issue (llev; York, 19o0):
United ::^wions £-cai:istiGal Yearbook
-9^5 ; Sever-tcenoh Issue (!>'ew York, I906); United
• \4.^'^*~. >. ^azi.^ uical Yearbook 19^9? Iventy-first Issue (ivew York, 1970).
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111 112 112 112 112 117 120 123 127
ri
19o0 U.001 i9o2 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 196S 1969
132
1^ ^2 lli^ 117 119 122 129 129 122 125
^' 9^^ 9^ 95 93 100 103 102 lol: 105
105 no 111 no m 113 n^ -114
97 93 90 95 98 96 9I1 9it
105 100 97 97 98 100 103 106
9-5 52 • 89 88 87 ^e 8k 87 88
112 nii
91 W.A.
Ill 115
92
628 551
cC3 601 59p £02 611 617 627 632
101.: 100.2 99.2 100.3 101.8 102.8 104.5 105.3 10i;.7 110.2
-.095'
-.II7S
-.1290 -.1167 -.1002 -.1381 .iij.83
-.1681
-.2130
-.1973
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Appendix: Table B
OFFICIAL VERSUS KAEKET CURRENCY EXCHANGE RAT^
(U.S. dollars per unit of foreign currency)
Year
India (Runee) Pakistan (Rupee) Brazil (
Official
Cruzeiro)
Official^ Market" Official^ Market Market
L . ,
1969 .1325 ,0900 .2098 .1000 . .2498^ .0002
1968 .1326 .0800 .2089 .1009 .3135*^ .0002
1967 .1330 .0800 .2095 .1050 .3720'' .0003
1966 .1332 .0700 .2095 .1100 .0005 .oooH
1965 .209U .1050 .2096 .1050 .0006 • OOOU
1961; .2095 .1300 .2097 .1100 .0009 .0006
1963 .2101 .1550 .2103 .1300 .0017 .0013
1962 • .2107 .1300 .2111 .1200 .0029 .0021
1961 .2091 .1375 .2096 .1150 .ooVo .0035
196c .2105 .lUOO .2109 .1350 .0056 .0050
1959 .2110 .1500 .2III4 .1300 .0070 .0068
1958 .2103 .1950 .2107 .1330 .0077 .0073
1957 .209U .1900 .209s . .1300 .011+5 .0130
1956 .2099 .2000 .2103 .1350 .0125 .0115
1955 .2090
d
n.a. .3013
d
n.a. .0550 .OI3I;
1951; .2115
d
n .a
.
.301,3
d
n.a. .0550 .0185
1953 .2113 dn.a. .301+3 dn.a. .0550 .0233
Average .1919 .1323 .2266 .1135 .0132 .0063
Average
U.S. do]
per
Liar 5.26 1 .50 U.iil 8.1il; 75.76 158.73
Source: Wall Street Journal
,
Foreign 2xcihange List:ings, 1953-1969.
Selling prices for bank transfers in the U.S. for pai-nents abroad.
Market prices for foreign cartknotes.
Since July 6, 19^8, the official exchance rate was 5.1t05Ul cents
per cruzeiro. On February 13, I967, new cruzeiros were issued at the
ratio of 1 to 1000 old cruzeiros.
Kot available.

FOOTNOTES
Thanks are due to the International Development Research Center of
Indiana University for their cooperation and assistance in the production of
this paper.
1. In addition to the official U.S. aid program, the private
sector of the U.S. economy extends export, credits and investments,
accounting for approximately one-third of net global financial resource
movements. As these financial flews are in the mainstream of the ex-
change economy, primarily motivated by profit considerations, -we have
not included them within the grants economy framework of this study.
2. O.E.C.D., Resources for the Developing World (Paris, 1970),
?. 323.
3. Janos Korvath, "On the Evaluation of International Grants
Policy," Pablic Finance
,
Vol. 26, No. 2 (1971).
k. The grants (or transfer) economy "consists of all one-way trans-
fers of exchangeables . In an act of exchange between two parties, A and
B, A gives something to 3 and 3 gives something to A. In a grant, A
gives something to B and B gives nothing in the way of a clearly iden-
tifiable exchangeable to A. Exchange involves therefore bilateral or
Eultilateral transfers whereas grants consist of \inilateral transfers
of exchangeables. This view of grants does not preclude the possibility
that a grant from A to B may be accompanied by certain intangible trans-
fers from B to A in the way of prestige or status, and so on, but these
are not usually classified as exchangeables. The distinction between
a grant and an exc'nange, therefore, is subject to some ambiguity but
the fact that ve have a fairly clear concept of an exchangeable makes
the distinction workable; In an exchar^ge of equal values, the net
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worth of the parties is not changed; in a grant, hcv/ever, the net vorth
of the grantor is alv/ays diminiohed and that the the grantee is increased.
A G^^'^nt or ci-'i^j moreover, is sometimes a sacrifice to the grantor."
Martin Pfaff and Anita Pfaff , "The Relationship between the Transfer
and Exchange Sectors of the Economy," American Statistical Associa-
tlon 1969 ?-rocecdinf;3, of the Business and Economic Statistics Session
(Washington), pp. 532-3.
5. Export-Import Banlc of the United States.
6. See recent proposals by Andrew M. Kajnarck, "The Allocation
of Aid by Multilateral Agencies," in Kenneth E. Boulding, Janos Hor-
vath, and Martin Pfaff (ed.). The Grants Economy in International Per-
spective (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1971, forthcoming).
7. Even prinary effects often meet with problems of valuation,
leading to the making of certain arbitrary assumptions. For example,
an aid flov; consisting of a Pablic Law U80 (P.L. i^80) dollar sale con-
tains the fcllovring grant element considerations:
a. The aid cost to the U.S. is valued at supported domestic prices;
if it is valued at competitive v/orld market ra"tes, the grant ratio would
be reduced. Also, the surplus goods sold were not produced for the aid
program originally, but constituted a part of the U.S. exchange economy
during initial economic transactions. Their cost to the government
would therefore be affected. If the surplus commodities merely were
being stored, giving them away to save storage costs might be economi-
cally advantageous if the prospect of domestic usage was quite dim,
resvilting in a grant ratio perhaps close to 0.
b. From a benefit-to- thc-recipient standpoint, the storplus com-
Bioditiec could be valued at the recipient country's prices, thus re-
ducing, or possibly increasing, the grant ratio, A decrease also may
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occur if the recipient is not able to utilize the surplus coramodities
in an efficient manner. In addition, the commodities could upset
the balance of the recipient econoaiiy's agricultural price structure,
creating a negative "trading factor" effect (considered later).
c. Finally, computing the grant ratio with different arbitrarily
chosen market rates of disco-ant within the range of the interest rate
structure in either the donor or the recipient economy would produce
different magnitudes.
8. Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered (Paris: O.E.C.D.,
1966), pp. 101-U.
9. Ibid . (An assumption is made that the principal is repaid in
equal installments.)
10. Korvath, op.cit .
11. For a more complete discussion of the ramifications of aid
tying, see: I.M.D. Little and J.M. Clifford, International Aid: A
Discussion of the Flow of Public Resources from Rich to Poor Countries
,
Chapter VII (Chicago: AJLdine Publishing Co., 1966); Clive S. Gary,
Resource Flc.-.'S to Less -Developed Co-gntries (New York: Pi-'aeger, I969).
12. The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat has
estimated that the reduction in the vs-lue of a loan dvie to tying is at
least 10-20 percent.
13. 'For details in calcTxLating the indexes used in the tied aid
factor, see the Appendix, Table A.
ih, Ohlin, op.cit
. ,
p. 9^«
15. See BlTxal Jalan, "Gains to Donor Countries From Tied Aid,"
Finance and Develop.'.icnt (September, I969), pp. IU-I8.
16. In some ca:;cs, the borrcr/;er can be a public agency or a pri-
«
vate enterprise within the recipient country. The loan then may in-
volve repayment by the non-goverruaental borrower to the recipient
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country covcrnisont in local currency. The recipient governraent, in
tiirn, repays the U.S. Agency for International Development in dollars.
These loans arc terraed "two-step loans."
17. John Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," Review of Sconomics
Vol. XLV (h)
and Statistics . (iCovemoer, I963), p. 362. See also, VJilson S. Schmidt,
"The Economics of Charity," Journal of political Economy
,
Vol, 72
(August 196k), pp. 387-595.
18. Charles P. Kindleherger, Po^.rer and Money: The Politics of
International Bconoiuics and the Economics of International Politics
(New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 135.
19. U.S. Department of Agriculture, P.L. h80 Concessional Sales ,
Econo2iic ReseajTch Service, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 65
j
Septeraber, 1970, p. 36. From I956 to I969, of $5.2 billion lent, the
purchasing power depreciated by SO. 6 billion. The local c\irrency de-
velopment loans are assumed to be reduced by approximately the same
percentage
.
20. Hcr'/ath, op.cit .
21. Horvath, op.cit . Also, Janos Korv^th, "Rural America and the
Grants Economy," American Journal of Agricaltural Sconomics
,
Vol. 53
(iTovember 1971, forthcoming).
22. P.L. kQO Concessional Sales
, op.cit
. , p. 7.
23. . Pincus, op.cit
. , p. 363, analyzed surplus agricultural ccm:ao-
dity aid with three methods: (l) valued at U.S. prices, (2) valued at
export market prices, and (3) valued at world market prices using esti-
mates of elasticity of demand for U.S. e:cports.
2^:-. For a thorough mathematical discvission of additional factors
and refinements to the comprehensive grant ratio formula, see Janos ?:or-
vath and Donald P. l-linascian, "A Mathematical Exposition of Internation'tl
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,
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25. Counterpart funds are the local currency proceeds of for-
eicn aid. For more information, see Alexis E. Lachaan, The Local
Currency Proceeds of Foreien Aid (Paris: O.E.C.D.j I96Q), pp. 1-7.
26. Some conflict of definition is inevitable in this connection.
For example, Mexico excludes any Eximbank transaction as foreign aid.
(See I.M.D. Little and J.M. Clifford, op.cit ., p. 233.)
27. P.L. ^80 Concessional Sales , op.cit . , p. 32.
28. Pincus, op.cit
., p. 36I. Pincus also used 5 and 5 3A P^^"
cent to approximate the domestic opportunity cost and the World Bank
lending rate, respectively. The change in grant elements attributable
to the consideration of varying opportunity costs (above in ovir formula
the comparative rate of discount, q), is the subject of another ongoing
research.- This latter also embraces the trade-off coefficients which
result fraa the alteration of concessionary terms within the contracts.
Preliminary results are available from the senior author.
29. This procedure is followed" because detailed information is
published regarding the country-use of funds from P.L. 480 sales, and
the bulk of countries receiving surplus commodities also receive develop-
ment loans repayable in loca.1 currency.
• 30. Year-by-year and country-by-covintry computations for 1964-1969
have also been made, and the results may be obtained from the authors
upon request.
31. 3y 1971, all P.L. 480 sales v?ill be on a dollar basis.
32. For an assessment of policy considerations, see: Lester B.
Pearson (ed.), Partners in Development (Nov; York: Praeger, I969);
Robert E. Ashcr, Foroif-n Aid: The Postvor Record and Targets for the
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